

Radioactivity from Fukushima nuclear accident detected in Lisbon: concerns of and communication with the public

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Introduction

- Following the NPP accident in Fukushima (Japan, 11 March 2011), fission products from the reactor were released into the atmosphere
- In Portugal, anthropogenic radionuclides originated from the accident were first detected in aerosol samples (at Azores and Sacavém aerosol sampling stations about two weeks after the accident)


Radioactivity Environmental Monitoring

Radionuclide Particulate Station RN53

International Monitoring System for the verification of the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)


Aerosol Sampling Station ASS-500

National Radiological Monitoring Programme and Art. 35 of the EURATOM Treaty



Aerosol sampling station (ASS-500)








Compressed filter





Radionuclide Particulate Station RN53 (S. Miguel)













Backward trajectories

- “Backward trajectories” – To determine the origin of the air masses that reach the aerosol sampling station;
- HYSPLIT Model (HYbrid Single-Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory) - Air Resources Laboratory (USA) from NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration);
- Archive meteorological data GDAS (Global Data Assimilation System) from the National Weather Service of USA – NCEP (National Centers for Environmental Prediction).

Backward trajectories




Activity ratios


- Proportions of released radionuclides are variable according to the characteristics of the accident (“signature”);
- Comparing the ratios of the activities measured in Fukushima (by AIST) and in Sacavém (by IST) we could have an indication if the detected isotopes were originated from the same source

Ratios	Sacavém (IST)	Fukushima (AIST)
$^{137}\text{Cs}/^{134}\text{Cs}$	1,3	1,0
$^{137}\text{Cs}/^{131}\text{I}$	0,036	0,032
$^{137}\text{Cs}/^{132}\text{Te}$	0,2	0,2

- ▶ AIST - Advanced Industrial Science and Tecnology from Japan



ASS500 Particulates Detections



Atmospheric deposition on vegetation

^{137}Cs : $<0.5 \text{ Bq m}^{-2} - 2.3 \text{ Bq m}^{-2}$

^{134}Cs : $<0.4 \text{ Bq m}^{-2} - 2.2 \text{ Bq m}^{-2}$

^{131}I : $<0.8 \text{ Bq m}^{-2} - 6.1 \text{ Bq m}^{-2}$

Milk

^{137}Cs : $<0.1 \text{ Bq L}^{-1} - 0.2 \text{ Bq L}^{-1}$

^{131}I : $<0.1 \text{ Bq L}^{-1} - 0.3 \text{ Bq L}^{-1}$




▶ Leafy vegetables

^{137}Cs : $<0.2 \text{ Bq kg}^{-1}$

^{131}I : $<0.2 \text{ Bq kg}^{-1} - 0.8 \text{ Bq kg}^{-1}$

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), EUA



Institut de Radioprotection et Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), France



Station	Date	Radionuclides (mBq m ⁻³)				
		¹³¹ I	¹³⁷ Cs	¹³⁴ Cs	¹³² Te	
Cherbourg	25-Mar	0,067				
	28-Mar	0,41				
	31-Mar	0,75				
	01-Apr	0,097				
Orsay	26-Mar	0,06				
	27-Mar	0,35				
	28-Mar	0,36	0,008	0,008		
	29-Mar	0,52	0,058	0,049	0,013	
	30-Mar	0,52	0,04	0,03	0,01	
	31-Mar	0,6	0,08	0,07		
	01-Apr	0,34				
	02-Apr	0,13				
	Vésinet	27-Mar	0,227			
		28-Mar	0,522			
30-Mar		0,76				
31-Mar		1,05				

Communication with the public

- Even though the radioactivity levels were very low, some concerns were raised among the public;
- Information are available from different sources and with different degrees of confidence;
- The communication to the public needs to be carefully coordinated between all the authorities in order to provide non conflicting information;
- Confidence in authorities is very easy to lose but very difficult to build up again.

Communication with the public

- In the framework of the PREPARE project (WP3 on management of contaminated foodstuffs/feedstuffs and other goods) National panels with the relevant Stakeholders were organized, resulting in very interesting conclusions:



Communication with the public

- Communication paths must be clear, to avoid confusion and contradictory messages;
- To ensure that information is quickly provided, generic and easy to understand key messages should be prepared in advance;
- All relevant stakeholders should be involved in the communication plans as well as in emergency exercises;
- Information to the public should be clear, concise and complete;

Communication with the public

- There is a general need for more education and training across all stakeholders, including the media;
- Many similarities between stakeholders sensibilities in NPP countries and non-NPP countries;
- With slight variations, concerns raised in Portugal were shared in other countries.

Thank you for your attention